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Abstract—The protection of sensitive data stored in the cloud
is paramount. Among the techniques proposed to provide
protection, attribute-based access control, which frequently
uses ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE), has
received a lot of attention in the last years. Recently, Jahan
et al. (IEEE 40th Conference on Local Computer Networks,
2015) propose a scheme based on CPABE where users have
reading and writing access to the outsourced data. We analyze
the scheme by Jahan et al. and we show that it has several
security vulnerabilities. For instance, the cloud server can get
information about encrypted messages by using a stored ci-
phertext and an update of that ciphertext. As another example,
users with writing access are able to decrypt all the messages
regardless of their attributes. We discuss the security claims
made by Jahan et al. and point out the reasons why they do
not hold. We also explain that existing schemes can already
provide the advantages claimed by Jahan et al.
1. Introduction
The protection of sensitive data stored in the cloud
is paramount. Sensitive data must be protected not only
from unauthorized users, but also from the cloud servers.
Security and privacy issues are among the main reasons
why many organizations refrain from outsourcing their
private data to the cloud [1], [2], despite the cost savings
provided by the cloud.
Previous Work. Different techniques have been proposed
to protect data outsourced to the cloud [3], [4], [5]. Among
them, attribute-based access control has been given a lot of
attention in recent years [6], [7], [8], [9]. In attribute-based
access control, users are given attributes, while records
of data are associated with access control policies. Only
the users whose attributes satisfy the access control policy
associated with a record of data can access that record of
data. Attribute-based access control is adequate for large
environments such as the cloud. Because of the large number
of users, a data owner may not know the identities of all the
users who should be given access to a record of data, and
therefore he is unable to apply user-based access control.
Instead, the data owner describes an access control policy
that describes the attributes that a user must possess in order
to get access to data.
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE)
[10], [11], [12], [13] is the main technique employed to
provide attribute-based access control in a cloud environ-
ment. In CPABE, ciphertexts are associated with an access
control policy. A user obtains a secret key associated to her
attributes and is able to decrypt a ciphertext if her attributes
satisfy the access control policy associated with the cipher-
text. Different CPABE schemes have been proposed in the
literature. In some schemes, the ciphertexts reveal the access
control policy to which they are associated, while in other
schemes the ciphertexts hide the access control policy.
Several schemes propose the use of attribute-based en-
cryption to protect data outsourced to the cloud. These
schemes can be classified into two groups: those that provide
users with reading access [6], [7], [8], [9], and those that
give users reading and writing access [14], [15], [16]. We
will focus on the latter.
Zhao et al. [14] propose a scheme that employs CPABE
and attribute-based signatures. In a nutshell, the data owner
encrypts a record of data by using CPABE on input an
access control policy. Then, the ciphertext is signed by
using an attribute-based signature scheme on input a signing
policy. To read data, a user whose attributes satisfy the
access control policy verifies the signature and decrypts the
ciphertext. To write data, a user must possess a secret key
for attribute-based signatures that satisfies the signing policy.
The cloud server verifies that the signing policy remains
unmodified when a new ciphertext is uploaded.
Ruj et al. [15] propose a decentralized version of the
scheme in [14]. In [15], when writing data, users can
modify both the access control policy associated with
the ciphertext and the signing policy associated with the
signature. Liu et al. [16] propose a scheme where CPABE
is employed along with a hierarchical structure of multiple
authorities.
Our Contribution. Recently, Jahan et al. [17] propose a
scheme that employs an extension of the CPABE scheme
in [10] and any existentially unforgeable signature scheme.
The main claimed advantages over the schemes in [14], [15],
[16] are that their scheme does not allow a writer to modify
the access control policy associated with a ciphertext and
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that some computations related to the CPABE scheme can
be outsourced.
We show that the scheme in [17] has several security
vulnerabilities. Namely, the cloud server can get information
about encrypted messages by using a stored ciphertext and
an update of that ciphertext. Additionally, users with writing
access are able to decrypt all the messages regardless of
their attributes and without knowledge of the group secret
key. We discuss the security claims made in [17] and point
out the reasons why they do not hold.
Furthermore, we show that existing schemes, such
as Zhao et al. [14], can apply the restriction that users
with writing access are not able to modify the access
control policy associated with a ciphertext. In addition, the
CPABE computations that can be outsourced are mainly
new computations introduced in [17], not those in the
original CPABE scheme in [10].
Outline of the paper. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the concept
of CPABE and its security properties, and we recall the
CPABE scheme in [10]. We also describe existentially
unforgeable signature schemes. In Section 3, we describe
in detail the scheme proposed in [17]. In Section 4, we
describe the security vulnerabilities of the scheme proposed
in [17], and in Section 5 we explain why the security claims
made in [17] do not hold. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Technical Background
2.1. Bilinear Maps
Let G, G˜ and Gt be groups of prime order p. A map
e : G × G˜ → Gt must satisfy bilinearity, i.e., e(gx, g˜y) =
e(g , g˜)xy; non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators g ∈ G
and g˜ ∈ G˜, e(g , g˜) generates Gt; and efficiency, i.e., there
exists an efficient algorithm G(1k ) that outputs the pairing
group setup (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) and an efficient algorithm
to compute e(a, b) for any a ∈ G, b ∈ G˜. If G = G˜ the
map is symmetric and otherwise asymmetric.
2.2. Access Structures and Access Trees
Let {s1, s2, . . . , sn} be a set of attributes. A collec-
tion P ⊆ 2{s1,s2,...,sn} is monotone if, ∀ B and C, if
B ∈ P and B ⊆ C then C ∈ P. An access structure
(respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) P of non-empty subsets
of {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, i.e., P ⊆ 2{s1,s2,...,sn}\∅. The sets in
P are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in P are
called the unauthorized sets.
Let T be a tree representing an access structure. Each
non-leaf node x represents a threshold gate described by an
amount nx of children and a threshold value kx such that
0 < kx ≤ nx. (When kx = 1, x represents an OR gate and,
when kx = nx, x represents an AND gate.) Each leaf node
x is described by an attribute.
We denote by parent(x) the parent of node x, and by
att(x) the attribute associated with the leaf node x. The
children of every node are ordered from 1 to nx. index(x)
returns such a number associated with the node x.
Let T be an access tree with root r, and Tx the subtree
of T rooted at x (hence T equals Tr). Tx(A) is a function
that returns 1 if the set of attributes A satisfies Tx. Tx(A)
is computed recursively as follows. If x is a non-leaf node,
evaluate Tx′ for all children x′ of node x. Tx(A) returns 1
when at least kx children return 1. If x is a leaf node, Tx(A)
returns 1 when att(x) ∈ A.
2.3. Ciphertex-Policy Attribute-based Encryption
A ciphertex-policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE)
scheme [10] possesses the algorithms (ABESetup,ABEExt,
ABEEnc,ABEDec). The key generation center (KGC) exe-
cutes ABESetup(1k) to output public parameters par and
a master secret key msk . A user U with a set of attributes
A queries KGC, which runs ABEExt(msk ,A) and returns
a secret key skA. On input a message m and an access
structure P, ABEEnc(par ,m,P) computes a ciphertext ct
that can only be decrypted by a user U that possesses a set
of attributes A that satisfies P (ct implicitly contains P).
Algorithm ABEDec(par , ct , skA), on input a ciphertext ct
and a secret key skA, outputs the message m if A satisfies
P.
Definition 2.1 (Secure CPABE). Security for CPABE is
defined through the following game between a chal-
lenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs ABESetup(1k), keeps msk and sends par
to A.
• Phase 1. A requests secret keys for sets of attributes
A1, . . . ,Aq1 .
• Challenge. A sends two equal length messages m0 and
m1 and an access structure P∗ such that none of the
sets A1, . . . ,Aq1 satisfy P∗. C picks a random bit b,
runs ct∗ = ABEEnc(par ,mb,P∗) and sends ct∗ to A.
• Phase 2. A requests secret keys for sets of attributes
Aq1+1, . . . ,Aq that do not satisfy P∗.
• Guess. A outputs a guess b′ of b.
A CPABE scheme is secure if, for all p.p.t. adversaries A,
|Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | is negligible.
In Figure 1, we recall the CPABE scheme proposed
in [10]. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a hash function modelled
as a random oracle.
2.4. Signature Schemes
A signature scheme consists of the algorithms KeyGen,
Sign, and VfSig. Algorithm KeyGen(1k ) outputs a secret
key ssk and a public key spk , which include a description
of the message space M. Sign(ssk ,m) outputs a signature
s on message m ∈M. VfSig(spk , s,m) outputs 1 if s is a
valid signature on m and 0 otherwise.
• ABESetup(1κ). Run G(1κ) to get a pairing group setup Γ = (p,G,Gt, e, g). Pick random (α, β) ← Zp and
output parameters par = (Γ, h = gβ , U = e(g , g)α) and a master secret key msk = (par , β, gα).
• ABEExt(msk ,A). Pick random r ∈ Zp and, for each j ∈ A, pick random rj ∈ Zp. Compute the key as
skA = (D = g(α+r)/β , {Dj = gr ·H(j)rj , D′j = grj}j∈A).
• ABEEnc(par ,m,P). For each node x in the tree T that defines P, choose a polynomial qx of degree dx = kx−1,
where kx is the threshold value of x. Polynomials qx are chosen in a top-down manner, starting from the
root node R. Pick random s ← Zp and set qR(0) = s, and choose other dR points randomly to define qR
completely. For any other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose other dx points randomly to
define qx completely. Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T . The ciphertext consists of ct = (T , C˜ = m ·Us, C =
hs, {Cy = gqy(0), C ′y = H(att(y))qy(0)}y∈Y ).
• ABEDec(par , ct , skA). Define as follows a recursive algorithm ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, x). If x is a leaf node
and i = att(x) belongs to the set of attributes A associated with skA, ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, x) =
e(Di, Cx)/e(D
′
i, C
′
x) = e(g , g)
rqx(0). If i /∈ A, then ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, x) = ⊥.
If x is not a leaf node, then proceed as follows. For all the children z of x, call ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, z)
and store the output as Fz . Let Sx be an arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6= ⊥. If no such
set exists ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, z) = ⊥. Otherwise, let i = index(z) and S′x = {index(z)}z∈Sx , and, for
i ∈ Zp and a set S of elements in Zp, define the Lagrange coefficient ∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j . Compute
Fx =
∏
z∈Sx
F
∆i,S′x (0)
z = e(g , g)
r·qx(0)
ABEDec(par , ct , skA) executes ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, R), where R is the root node. If the tree T is
satisfied by the set of attributes A, ABEDecNode(par , ct , skA, R) returns A = e(g , g)rs. Finally, output
m = C˜/(e(C,D)/A).
Figure 1. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme in [10].
A signature scheme must fulfill the following correctness
and existential unforgeability properties [18].
Definition 2.2 (Correctness). Correctness ensures that the
algorithm VfSig accepts the signatures created by the
algorithm Sign on input a secret key computed by algo-
rithm KeyGen. More formally, correctness is defined as
follows.
Pr
[
(ssk , spk)
$←− KeyGen(1k ); m $←−M;
s
$←− Sign(ssk ,m) : 1 = VfSig(spk , s,m)
]
= 1
Definition 2.3 (Existential Unforgeability). The property of
existential unforgeability ensures that it is not feasible to
output a signature on a message without knowledge of
the secret key or of another signature on that message.
Let Os be an oracle that, on input ssk and a message
m ∈ M, outputs Sign(ssk ,m), and let Ss be a set that
contains the messages sent to Os. More formally, for any
ppt adversary A, existential unforgeability is defined as
follows.
Pr

(ssk , spk)
$←− KeyGen(1k );
(m, s)
$←− A(spk)Os(ssk ,·) :
1 = VfSig(spk , s,m) ∧
m ∈M ∧ m /∈ Ss
 ≤ (k)
3. Method for Providing Secure and Pri-
vate Fine-Grained Access to Outsourced Data
in [17]
In this section, we describe the protocol proposed
in [17]. The protocol is executed by the following entities.
• Data Owner. The data owner stores records of data
in the cloud. For each record of data, the data owner
specifies the users that have reading access and those
that have writing access.
• Manager. The manager is a trusted server run-
ning inside the data owner’s network and acts as a
key generation center for ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption.
• Cloud Server. The cloud server stores records of
data sent by the data owner. The data owner gives
users reading and writing access to the records of
data. The cloud server is assumed to be honest-but-
curious.
• Users. A user can access records of data stored in
the cloud server if the data owner has granted her
reading access. Additionally, a user can modify a
record of data stored in the cloud server if the data
owner has granted her writing access.
The protocol consists of eight steps.
Data Owner Setup. The data owner executes the following
steps:
• Create a bilinear group setup (p,G,Gt, e, g) ←
G(1k ), where 1k is the security parameter.
• Create a data owner secret key osk ← β, where β
is picked randomly by doing β ← Zp, and a data
owner public key opk ← (gβ , g1/β).
• Create a group secret key gsk ← u0, where u0 is
picked randomly by doing u0 ← Zp, and a group
public key gpk ← gu0 . The group secret key will be
known by the group of users with writing access.
• For each record of data to be outsourced to the
cloud server, create a signing key pair (ssk , spk)←
KeyGen(1k ).
Manager Setup. The manager receives (p,G,Gt, e, g), opk
and gpk as input. The manager executes the following steps:
• Pick random α1, α2 ← Zp, set α ← α1 + α2, and
create a manager secret key mgsk ← (α1, α2, α,
gα).
• Parse opk as (gβ , g1/β) and set a cloud key ck ←
(gα2/β , Vno), where Vno is the version number.
• Compute e(g , g)α, set h ← gβ and f ← g1/β and
create a public key pk ← (G, g , h, f, e(g , g)α, gpk ,
Vno).
Key Distribution. The data owner sends the group secret
key gsk to the group of users with writing access by using
a secure communication channel. The data owner sends
the signing verification keys spk to the cloud server, to the
users with reading access and to the group of users with
writing access. The data owner sends the signing secret
key ssk to the group of users with writing access by using
a secure communication channel.
Key Generation. The manager receives as input the public
key pk , the manager secret key mgsk , and a set of user
attributes A. The manager executes the following steps:
• Pick random r ∈ Zp. For each j ∈ A, pick random
rj ∈ Zp.
• Compute the key as skA = (D = g(α1+r)/β , {Dj =
gr ·H(j)rj , D′j = grj}j∈A).
As can be seen, the key generation corresponds to
executing the algorithm ABEExt of the CPABE scheme
in [10], where α1 is employed as secret key.
Encrypt. The data owner receives as input a public key pk ,
a group public key gpk , a record of data m and an access
control policy P, which is defined by an access tree T . Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a hash function modelled as a random
oracle. The data owner executes the following steps.
• For each node x in the tree T , choose a polynomial
qx of degree dx = kx− 1, where kx is the threshold
value of x. Polynomials qx are chosen in a top-
down manner, starting from the root node R. Pick
random s← Zp and set qR(0) = s, and choose other
dR points randomly to define qR completely. For
any other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x))
and choose other dx points randomly to define qx
completely.
• Set a time stamp τ and a version number v ← 0.
• Compute C ← m ·e(g , g)αs, C0 ← gu0s, and C ′′ ←
gβs.
• Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T . For all y ∈ Y ,
compute Cy ← gqy(0) and C ′y ← H(att(y))qy(0).
• Set the ciphertext ct ← (v, τ, T , C, C0, C ′′, {Cy,
C ′y}y∈Y ).
The manager shares α with the group members
by encrypting it using gpk . The cloud server computes
e(g , g)u0s by using C0. The final ciphertext generated by the
data owner is ct ← (v, τ, T , C ′ ← m · e(g , g)αse(g , g)u0s,
C, C0, C
′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ). Finally, the data owner signs the
ciphertext ct by running the algorithm Sign on input the
signing secret key ssk and ct .
Upload Ciphertext to Cloud. The data owner or a user with
writing access sends the ciphertext ct to the cloud server.
The cloud server executes the following steps.
• Verify τ .
• Verify the signature on the ciphertext ct by running
VfSig on input the signing verification key spk , the
signature and ct .
• If ct is uploaded by a user with writing access, for
all y ∈ Y , check whether Cy and C ′y in the stored
ciphertext are equal to Cy and C ′y in the uploaded
ciphertext. This check ensures that the access tree
T is the same in the stored and in the uploaded
ciphertext. If this condition is satisfied, the uploaded
ciphertext is accepted and stored.
Decrypt. A user who wishes to get access to a ciphertext ct
sends the signing verification key spk to the cloud server.
The cloud server compares spk with the signing verification
key stored. If they are equal, then the cloud server sends
the ciphertext ct and the cloud key ck to the user. The user
executes the following steps.
• Verify the signature on the ciphertext ct by running
VfSig on input the signing verification key spk , the
signature and ct .
• Parse ct as (v, τ, T , C ′, C, C0, C ′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y )
and set ct ′ as (T , C, C ′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ).
• Run the algorithm ABEDecNode described in Fig-
ure 1 on input the ciphertext ct ′, the secret key skA
for the user’s attributes, and the root node R. The
result is A = e(g , g)rs.
• Parse skA as (D, {Dj , D′j}j∈A) and ck as (gα2/β ,
Vno).
• If the user has reading access (i.e., the user does
not know the signing secret key ssk ), the user
decrypts the ciphertext by computing m ← C ·
A/e(C ′′, D)e(C ′′, gα2/β). The manager computes
e(C ′′, D), while the user computes e(C ′′, gα2/β)
and e(C ′′, D) · e(C ′′, gα2/β).
• If the user has writing access, the user de-
crypts the ciphertext by computing m ← C ′ ·
A/e(C ′′, D)e(C ′′, gu0/β)e(C ′′, gα2/β). The com-
putations of e(C ′′, D) and e(C ′′, gα2/β) are per-
formed by the manager and the cloud server re-
spectively. The computations of e(C ′′, gu0/β) and
e(C ′′, D)e(C ′′, gu0/β)e(C ′′, gα2/β) are performed
by the user.
A user with writing access and the cloud server execute
the following steps to compute an updated ciphertext for a
record of data m ′.
• The user computes e(C ′′, g1/β) = e(g , g)s, where
C ′′ is in ct and g1/β is in the public key.
• The user computes (e(g , g)s)α = e(g , g)αs.
• The cloud server computes e(C0, g) = e(g , g)u0s.
• The user computes C ′ ← m · e(g , g)u0s · e(g , g)αs
and C ← m · e(g , g)αs.
• The user selects a time stamp τ and increments the
version number v ← v + 1.
• The user replaces τ , v, C ′ and C in the ciphertext
ct by the new values.
• The user signs the new ciphertext ct by running the
algorithm Sign on input the signing secret key ssk
and ct .
Key Regeneration. When a member in the group is revoked,
a new user is added or a key is compromised, the manager
and the data owner execute the following steps.
• The manager picks random α′ ← Zp and chooses a
new cloud key ck ← gα′2/β , where α′2 = α′ − α1.
α1 is not modified to avoid the need of updating all
the user secret keys skA.
• The manager updates the public key pk ←
(G, g , h, f, e(g , g)α′ , gpk , Vno), the cloud key ck ←
(gα2/β , Vno), and the manager secret key mgsk ←
(α1, α2, α
′, gα
′
), where Vno is incremented by 1.
• The data owner updates the group secret key gsk ←
ux, where ux ← Zp, and the group public key
gpk ← gux . gsk is sent to the group members by
using a secure channel.
• The manager encrypts α′ by using gpk and sends
the encrypted α′ to the group members.
For each encrypted record of data, the data owner and
the cloud server execute the following steps.
• For each encrypted record of data, the data owner
computes C ← m · e(g , g)α′s and Cx ← guxs and
sends C and Cx to the cloud.
• The data owner and the holder of gsk compute a
re-encryption key gux/u0 and send it to the cloud.
• The cloud computes C˜x ← Ce(C0, gux/u0) = m ·
e(g , g)α
′se(g , g)uxs.
• The data owner sets the re-encrypted ciphertext as
ct ← (v ← x, τ, T , C˜x, C, Cx, C ′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ).
• The data owner computes a new key pair (ssk ,
spk) ← KeyGen(1k ) whenever there is a change
in group membership.
4. Analysis of the Method in [17]
In this section, we discuss the method in [17] and
describe its security vulnerabilities.
The cloud server can get information about encrypted
messages. A ciphertext for a message m is of the form
ct ← (v, τ, T , C ′, C, C0, C ′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ). When a user
with writing access updates the ciphertext to encrypt a
message m ′, the user updates the values C ′ and C to new
values C ′up and Cup. As can be seen, the cloud server can
compute m ′/m = C ′up/C
′ and m ′/m = Cup/C. This
violates the security properties of a CPABE scheme. For
instance, if 1 = m ′/m , the cloud server learns that the
writer did not modify the stored encrypted message.
The reason of this vulnerability is that the stored cipher-
text and the updated ciphertext use the same randomness.
To securely update the encrypted message, it is necessary
to compute a new ciphertext with fresh randomness.
We believe the reason why the scheme under analysis
does not compute new ciphertexts with fresh randomness
is to prevent a user with writing access from changing the
access control policy of a ciphertext. When a ciphertext is
uploaded to the cloud by a user with writing access, the
cloud server checks that the elements {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y of the
updated ciphertext are equal to those of the stored ciphertext.
If the new ciphertext employs fresh randomness, comparing
the elements {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y is not possible.
However, we note that the ciphertexts in the CPABE
scheme proposed in [10], unlike those in other schemes [13],
reveal the access control policy. Therefore, the cloud server
is able to check that the updated ciphertext and the stored
ciphertext have the same access control policy even if the
updated ciphertext is a completely new ciphertext with
fresh randomness.
A user with writing access can decrypt all the ciphertexts
regardless of her attributes. A user with writing access
has knowledge of α. Given a ciphertext ct ← (v, τ, T , C ′,
C, C0, C
′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ), a user with writing access can
decrypt the ciphertext by doing m ← C/e(C ′′α, f), where
f is in the public key pk . As can be seen, the user can
obtain the message by using only α, i.e., without using the
secret key skA related to her attributes.
The reason of this vulnerability is that α is the master
secret key of the CPABE scheme. With knowledge of α, it
is possible to decrypt any ciphertext.
We note that the reason why users with writing access
are given α is to update ciphertexts. Concretely, they
employ α to compute (e(g , g)s)α = e(g , g)αs. However,
as explained above, for the scheme to be secure, new
ciphertexts with fresh randomness need to be computed,
and the users with writing access do not need to know α
to compute new ciphertexts.
The scheme provides both user-based and attribute-
based access control. We also note that a user needs to
present the signing verification key related to a ciphertext
in order to be able to download it. Therefore, even if a user
with writing access can decrypt all the ciphertexts because
she knows α, she can only download those for which she
possesses the corresponding signing verification key.
Here we observe that the scheme under analysis provides
simultaneously user-based access control and attribute-based
access control. As can be seen, the data owner encrypts a
message under an access control policy that determines the
attributes that a user must possess in order to be able to
obtain the message. Additionally, for each record of data,
the data owner computes a signing key pair and sends the
public key to all the users with reading access, whereas the
secret key is sent to the users that have writing access.
Implementing simultaneously user-based and attribute-
based access control is inefficient and counterproductive.
Attribute-based access control is ideal for a cloud
environment where the number of users is large and the
data owner does not know the identities of the users who
should be given access to his records of data. Instead,
the data owner describes the attributes that the user must
possess. In contrast, user-based access control is ideal for
smaller environments where the data owner knows the
identities of all the users that should have access to the
records of data. User-based access control is less flexible
than attribute-based access control and is only applicable
in smaller settings, but it allows the use of encryption
schemes that are more efficient than CPABE, such as
identity-based broadcast encryption [19]. Given that the
scheme under analysis requires the data owner to know the
identities of the users that must have reading or writing
access to each of the records of data, using CPABE to
encrypt the messages does not make sense.
The users with writing access can decrypt messages
without knowledge of the group secret key. A ciphertext
is of the form ct ← (v, τ, T , C ′, C, C0, C ′′, {Cy, C ′y}y∈Y ).
The method in [17] explains that C ← m · e(g , g)αs and
C ′ ← m · e(g , g)αse(g , g)u0s are the encrypted messages
for the readers and for the writers respectively.
In the decryption method described for the writers, the
writers do m ← C ′·A/e(C ′′, D)e(C ′′, gu0/β)e(C ′′, gα2/β).
To do that computation, the writers need to know the group
secret key u0 in order to compute gu0/β .
However, the writers can also decrypt the ciphertext
without knowledge of u0. First, we point out that, in princi-
ple, nothing prevents a writer from decrypting C instead of
C ′. To decrypt C, a writer can use the same computations
as a reader. We note that both readers and writers possess
the signing verification key spk required to download a
ciphertext from the cloud server, and thus at this stage the
cloud server does not distinguish whether the user is a reader
or a writer.
Furthermore, even if we assume that the cloud server
distinguishes a reader from a writer and gives a writer only
the value C ′, the writer can still decrypt without knowledge
of u0. As can be seen, the writer can use the element C0
to compute m ← C ′ ·A/e(C ′′, D)e(g , C0)e(C ′′, gα2/β). In
fact, the element C0 in the ciphertext is unnecessary since it
is not used at all in the decryption process, and as we have
shown it allows writers to decrypt C ′ without knowledge of
u0.
5. Discussion
In Section 4, we have described several security
vulnerabilities in the method proposed in [17]. In [17],
a security analysis is provided and some claims on the
security of the scheme are made. We note that, in [17],
formal security definitions that state accurately the security
properties of the scheme are not provided. Consequently,
the security claims made in [17] are not formally proven.
In this section, we discuss the security claims made in [17].
The cloud server and the manager cannot decrypt
ciphertexts. In [17], it is claimed that the cloud server
cannot decrypt ciphertexts because the cloud server cannot
obtain secret keys skA, whereas the manager cannot decrypt
ciphertexts because the manager is not given access to them.
However, as described in Section 4, the cloud server, given
a ciphertext that encrypts m and an updated ciphertext
that encrypts m ′, can compute m ′/m , which violates the
security properties of CPABE defined in Section 2.3. With
respect to the manager, we note that the manager performs
the tasks of a key generation center in a CPABE scheme,
and key generation centers in CPABE are trusted.
Collusion resistance. In [17], it is claimed that the method
benefits from the collusion resistance property of the
CPABE scheme in [10], and thereby a group of users
cannot decrypt a ciphertext if one user in the group is
not able to do so on her own. However, as described
in Section 4, users with writing access are given α and
therefore they can use α to decrypt every ciphertext
regardless of their attributes.
Preventative measure against compromise of gsk or α.
In [17], update mechanisms for gsk and α are proposed
for the case that gsk or α are compromised. As described
in Section 4, for the scheme to be secure, an updated
ciphertext must be a new ciphertext for fresh randomness.
Therefore, α can be kept secret by the manager, thereby
reducing greatly the risk of compromise. As for gsk , we
have shown that a user with writing access can decrypt
ciphertexts without knowledge of gsk .
The cloud server, the manager and the readers cannot
perform the write operation. In [17], it is claimed that the
cloud server, the manager and the readers cannot perform a
write operation because they do not know the secret signing
key ssk . It is also noted that, if a user attempts to upload
a ciphertext that she previously downloaded, the cloud
server would reject it because the time stamp is invalid.
The method in [17] requires the data owner to create a
signing key pair for each record of data and to distribute
the signing secret key to the users with writing access via
a secure channel. The concrete properties of the secure
channel are not described. We note that both authentication
and confidentiality are essential to prevent impersonation
attacks and disclosure of the secret signing key. On the
other hand, we note that computing and distributing new
signing keys for each record of data is very inefficient.
As can be seen, most of the security claims made in [17]
can be disproved. We think that defining security formally,
i.e., defining precisely the security properties of the scheme
and the capabilities of the adversary, is key to conduct a
formal security analysis. The lack of security definitions
makes it unclear what the security properties of the scheme
are and leads to unproven security claims that, as in [17],
do not hold.
Additionally, we think that fixing the method in [17] is
unnecessary. The two main advantages claimed in [17] over
previous work are, first, that their method prevents a writer
from modifying the access control policy of a ciphertext,
and second, that some computations can be outsourced.
Nevertheless, as we have explained, the ciphertexts in the
CPABE scheme in [10] reveal the access control policy.
Therefore, in other methods that provide reading and writing
access to the cloud based on the CPABE scheme in [10],
such as [14], the cloud server can check that the access
control policy has not been modified. As for outsourcing
some computations, we note that the method in [17] is
computationally more expensive than the original CPABE
scheme in [10]. Moreover, the computations that can be
outsourced in [17] are mainly the additional ones introduced
in [17].
6. Conclusion
Recently, Jahan et al. [17] have proposed a scheme to
outsource data securely to the cloud based on ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption. We have analyzed the
scheme proposed in [17] and we have shown that it has
several security vulnerabilities. We have also discussed why
the security claims made in [17] do not hold. Particularly,
we have highlighted the need of providing formal security
definitions and a formal security analysis. Furthermore, we
have explained that existing schemes can already offer the
advantages claimed by [17].
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